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Summary. The latest financial crisis has painfully revealed the dangers arising from
a globally interconnected financial system. Conventional approaches based on the
notion of the existence of equilibrium and those which rely on statistical forecasting
have seen to be inadequate to describe financial systems in any reasonable way. A
more natural approach is to treat fi- nancial systems as complex networks of claims
and obligations between various financial institutions present in an economy. The
generic frame- work of complex networks has been successfully applied across several
dis- ciplines, e.g., explaining cascading failures in power transmission systems and
epidemic spreading. Here we review various network models address- ing financial
contagion via direct inter-bank contracts and indirectly via overlapping portfolios of
financial institutions. In particular, we discuss the implications of the “robust-yet-
fragile” nature of financial networks for cost-effective regulation of systemic risk.
1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, the generic framework of complex networks has
been used to address problems in a variety of scientific disciplines. The study of
evolutionary dynamics of populations [1], spreading of diseases [2], spreading
of failures in power transmission systems [3], dynamics of opinion formation
[4], working of genetic regulation [5]; all heavily rely upon viewing and un-
derstanding the underlying systems as complex networks which represent the
interaction between their various constituent elements. It is now well-known
that the emergent or collective behavior in these systems are greatly influ-
enced by the topology of the underlying network of connections together with
the particular kind of dynamic processes which run on it [6, 7, 8].
One of the latest entry into the class problems to be analyzed using meth-
ods based on the theory of complex networks is the issue of spreading of
failures in financial/economic systems. Often dubbed as systemic risk, this
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refers to the possibility of spread of initial distress at a single or a few finan-
cial institutions such as banks to a significant fraction of a financial network.
Though earlier studies of such contagion exist, it is safe to say that it is only
in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-09 that viewing systems such
as interbank markets from the standpoint of the theory of complex networks
became mainstream [9, 10].
More and more direct and indirect connections are being made everyday
between financial institutions as the world increasingly becomes an economi-
cally globalized one. This together with modern day financial products such as
CDS (credit default swaps) or CDO (collateralized debt obligations) make to-
day’s financial systems a very complex one and hard to analyze. Conventional
approaches based on the notion of the existence of equilibrium and those which
rely on statistical forecasting have seen to be inadequate to describe financial
systems in any reasonable way [11]. Conventional theory often makes unre-
alistic assumptions and is capable of analyzing only simple situations. Most
importantly, it cannot handle non-linearities and feedback mechanisms ubiq-
uitous in financial systems [12]. Inadequacy of the conventional approaches
together with the spread of concepts from complex network theory to the eco-
nomic/financial community lead to the conclusion that a more natural way to
describe financial systems is to treat them as complex networks of claims and
obligations between various financial institutions present in an economy. It
is to be noted that a significant push towards this direction was provided by
people working on ecological and epidemiological systems (e.g., Robert May
[13]). The result is that there has been an exponential increase in the studies
of financial networks employing ideas and tools from the complex networks
literature and the terminology of latter nowadays finds commonplace in the
discussions related to contagion in financial systems.
In the simplest form, the nodes of a financial network are institutions in-
volved in financial intermediation (called banks in short hereafter) and the
links between the nodes represent lending/borrowing relationships. The links
are therefore directed (usually represented as directed from borrower to lender
indicating the anticipated direction of cash flow after the link has been estab-
lished) and weight of a link represents the amount of money involved in the
transaction between the nodes connected by that link. The banks may have
other kinds of direct and indirect connections between them which are dis-
cussed in section 2. Given such a financial network, the term systemic risk
refers to the possibility of an initial financial distress at a single or a few
banks (say their defaulting due to a loss of value of their asset holdings) to
spread through the network causing the default of a significant number of
other banks in the network. Such a system wide collapse has serious repercus-
sions for the financial system and global economy in general and could affect
the lives of millions in a negative way as painfully revealed in the crisis of
2007-09.
We can easily see the parallels of the problem of the collapse of a financial
network with that of an ecological network or the spread of an infectious dis-
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ease. Although all these problems deal with the transmission of a ‘failure’ at a
node to its neighbors in a general sense, there are also marked differences be-
tween them [14]. A feature which distinguishes financial networks from others
is that unlike the failure of a node in an ecological network or an epidemio-
logical network, the failure of a node in a financial network depends upon the
‘internal structure’ of that node (i.e., balance sheet structure of the bank)
and the ‘cumulative health’ of its neighbors in the network. So unlike simple
stochastic rules used to model for e.g., the spread of an infectious disease (as
in SIR model), here we need to consider the internal balance sheet dynamics
of a node in detail.
Our aim in this review is to give a broad overview of the various devel-
opments in the field of systemic risk of financial networks and discuss some
future directions. In this respect, we will mainly focus on the literature that
concentrates on the use of tools from the study of complex networks. There
is an extensive literature on banking systems based on more traditional point
of views like the ones using equilibrium models. We will occasionally mention
other strands of research but will refrain from discussing them in any detail.
This review is organized as follows. In section 2, we give an account of the
structure of a financial network and a detailed description of what constitutes
its nodes and links. We describe the kind of questions one would like to answer
about such networks. In section 3, we review various past efforts in modeling
contagion via interbank credit networks and in section 4, we review contagion
via fire-sale of commonly held assets by banks. We discuss some of our findings
related to asset contagion. In section 5 we conclude and discuss some future
possibilities.
2 Nodes and links of a financial network
As mentioned in the introduction, the nodes of a financial network are banks,
and the links represent various credit relationships. A sample financial network
based on data from the European Banking Authority (EBA) is given in Fig. 1.
To study the propagation of ‘failures’ or ‘defaults’ in a financial network, we
may represent a bank by its balance sheet structure which lists its various
assets and liabilities at any time. A schematic of a balance sheet is shown in
Fig. 2. Broadly, we may classify the assets of a bank into two types; namely
interbank assets (the money that the bank lent to other banks) and external
assets (investments like the money that the bank lent to other parties such
as business firms often receiving a collateral, deposits with a central bank,
etc). The external assets can be further classified into liquid assets (assets for
which there is a market and hence can be easily converted into cash. Examples
include cash, central bank reserves, high-quality government bonds, etc.)) and
illiquid ones (like secured or unsecured mortgages which cannot be used to
raise cash quickly). More detailed classification of assets is possible by further
considering divisions such as ‘Collateral assets’ (assets which may be used as
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Fig. 1. A graphical representation of the banking network of major European banks
created using data from the European Banking Authority (EBA). The size of the
nodes represent the relative size of the balance sheets of the banks, and the thickness
of the links represents the value of common asset exposures.
collateral in repo transactions) and ‘Reverse repo assets’ (i.e., collateralized
lending), etc. [15]. Considering such divisions is vital as the percentage of
assets in various classes decides whether a bank in need of immediate cash
for its promised payments can raise it in time or not. In general, the size
of the balance sheet, i.e., the total value of assets (or equivalently liabilities)
varies across banks. It is often found that the size distribution is heterogeneous
having a heavy tail [16].
The liability side of the balance sheet usually consists of interbank liabili-
ties (money that is owed to other banks) and retail deposits. Finer divisions
such as ‘repo liabilities’ (i.e., borrowing secured with collateral) may also be
considered [15]. The difference between the total assets and liabilities of a
bank gives its equity, also commonly called net worth or capital. The equity
is written on the liability side of the balance sheet indicating that it is money
owed to promoters and shareholders of the bank.
There are two important considerations regarding the ‘health’ of a node.
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Assets Liabilities
Interbank assets
External assets
Retail deposits
Interbank liabilities
Equity
Fig. 2. A simplified schematic of a balance sheet of a bank indicating a minimal
division of its assets and liabilities into various classes. Interbank assets represent
the money that the bank lent to other banks and external assets represents the likes
of money lent to industry. Interbank liabilities represent the money that is owed to
other banks. Finer sub devisions of assets and liabilities can be considered depending
upon the specific contexts (see text). The difference between the total assets and
liabilities gives its equity. The bank is insolvent if its net liabilities exceed the value
of its assets.
• Insolvency: A bank is considered insolvent if it has a negative net worth.
The net worth may become negative, say for e.g., due to a drop in the
prices of its assets (in a mark-to-market framework, the value of assets are
updated according to its current market price) or due to failed investments.
We may say that the bank cannot operate anymore as it cannot honor its
liabilities and should close down with appropriate insolvency proceedings,
though in reality, a number of things may happen like possible government
intervention, etc.
• Illiquidity: A bank is illiquid if its short term liabilities exceed liquid
assets and hence it cannot honor the former.
In both cases, the bank is in trouble, and this will affect other banks
to which it owes money. Also, the assets of the bank that is in trouble will
face devaluation, thus affecting other banks holding the same class of assets
on their balance sheets. Due to such feedbacks, initial distress can spread to
other banks in the network and may affect a large part of it.
The links between nodes represent lending/borrowing relations between
banks. They are directed and weighted, the weight of a link representing the
value owed (See Fig. 3). Note that banks may interact with others not only
through the above lending/borrowing relationship. Their balance sheet may
be affected by the fact that they are exposed to common assets. A sell off
or even a negative news about a bank might cause depreciation in the value
of the assets it holds and other banks which have exposure to these assets
will be affected. The sell off of an asset by a distressed bank will cause excess
supply of that asset and if the market depth of that asset is shallow, will
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Fig. 3. A directed and weighted network consisting of 5 banks. The thickness of
the links represent the value of credit exposures.
lower its value significantly. Such fire sale losses can quickly spread among
the banks in the network. These two mechanisms of interbank lending and
fire sale of assets form two important channels for spreading of crisis in a
financial network. There are other channels possible and which ones are more
relevant in reality is debatable. Upper [17] for e.g., argues that there is not
much evidence for interbank channels propagating distress. In any case, these
are possible channels of contagion under conceivable circumstances, and hence
it is important to understand them from a regulatory and individual point of
view.
Being able to understand the ‘behavior’ of a bank is crucial in the study of
systemic risk. This is because the way a bank organizes its balance sheet and
how they form connections will have a significant role in deciding whether
or not an initial default will propagate in the network causing significant
damage. An important factor which determines the actions of a bank is various
regulatory constraints set by a central authority (like a central bank). For e.g.,
there could be a capital ratio constraint set by the authority stipulating that
the activities of the bank should obey the constraint that its capital or net
worth should be a minimum percentage of its illiquid assets (8% is now a
typical figure under Basel III). Also the bank itself may have policies to keep
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its balance sheet structure in a specific way (For e.g., maintaining a constant
leverage ratio [18]).
3 Contagion via interbank linkages
Lending and borrowing relationships with other banks serve the purpose of
meeting the liquidity needs of a bank and profiting from the lending of idle liq-
uid money. While lending, there is, of course, the risk of default. Presumably,
forming more connections or dividing total exposure across several banks will
reduce such risk. On the other hand, a bank with more number of connection
will also have a higher probability of being hit by a defaulting counterparty.
The interplay between these two effects determines whether the default of a
single or a small set of banks will spread through the system.
3.1 Contagion via default spreading
One of the earlier works which explicitly incorporated the network aspects of
interbank lending/borrowing is by Allen & Gale [19]. The interbank network
they considered is rather simple compared to any real-world banking network
and involved only four banks. Two different connectivity structures of the
network are considered, and they showed that a complete network in which
each bank is connected to every other bank readily absorbs any initial shock.
However, an incomplete network structure makes the system prone to the
spread of an initial default.
A pioneering work which considered the effects of varying the important
features of interbank networks is by Nier et al. [20]. The network structures
considered were Erdos-Renyi (ER) type and a tiered one. In the latter, a few
large banks are connected to a large number of small banks where the latter
are mostly connected to the large ones. The effect of level of capitalization
of the banks, degree of the ER network, size of the interbank exposures, etc.
on the number of defaults is determined using simulations. It is found that at
smaller degrees of the network, a small increase in the degree of the network
causes an increase in the number of defaults, but at relatively higher degrees,
the effect of an initial default is contained. Predictably, higher capital levels
found to reduce the risk of contagion, but the effect is found to be non-linear.
The paper also briefly considers the ‘fire sale’ channel in which a distressed
bank sells off its asset causing a depreciation in the market value of the assets.
A landmark work is that of Gai & Kapadia [21] in which they formalized
the above setting by Nier et al. [20] and distinguished probability of conta-
gion from its extent (A comparison between these models is given in [22]). The
former denotes the probability of a systemic event conditional on an initial
shock while the latter denotes the percentage of banks affected conditional
on a systemic event. One should note that what constitutes a systemic event
is somewhat subjective. In this paper and several later works, a contagion
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is considered as systemic if more than 5% of the banks default. This might
seem like a very low number, but reflects the fact that even the default of
5% of banks is a severe event in an economy affecting a large number of peo-
ple and potentially wiping out millions of dollars. Their theoretical analysis
closely follows the study of cluster size distribution in a complex network using
generating functional formalism (see for e.g. [23]). The key finding was that
the phenomena of contagion in a financial network have a ‘robust-yet-fragile’
nature. i.e., even if the probability of contagion is very low, whenever a con-
tagion happens, it wipes out most of the system. The typical dependency of
probability and extent of contagion on the average degree of the ER network
is as shown in Fig. 4. Note that when the average degree is below 1, there is
no possibility of contagion as the network is a disconnected one and there is
no large connected component present. After that, the probability of conta-
gion increases with an increase in average degree, reaches a maximum value
and then decreases. This clearly shows the interplay of the two effects of risk
sharing and default spreading mentioned earlier. Higher degrees diffuses the
initial impact among many neighbors thus reducing the possibility of conta-
gion. However, once a contagion starts to spread, higher degrees can act as
an ideal setting for the propagation of defaults since many counter-parties of
a bank will be simultaneously affected. In a nutshell, this has the effect that
the banking network may respond in entirely different ways to similar shocks
at different nodes in the network.
The assumption made in [21] regarding the network structure as being
ER type and that all banks are of the same size is not in line with empirical
evidence about real-world banking networks which are found to have heavy-
tailed distribution for both connectivity and size of banks [24]. Caccioli et
al. [25] extended the Gai & Kapadia model to incorporate these effects. It
was found that a heterogeneous degree distribution makes the network more
resilient towards random defaults but more vulnerable to targeted attacks on
well-connected nodes. It was also found that a power-law distribution for the
size of the banks makes the contagion events more frequent. The effects of
policies such as increased capital requirements are also considered which are
seen to improve the resilience of the system. A recent work discussing the role
of assumptions made about the connectivity and size of banks is by Raddant
[16] in which features of real-world empirical networks were considered in some
detail.
3.2 Contagion via valuation adjustments
The seminal work of Eisenberg & Noe [26] provides an alternative viewpoint
on default contagion, namely as a problem of contract valuation. While each
bank has promised the repayment of a nominal amount, it might be unable
to hold up to its promise when the payment is due. As each repaid credit –
in full or in part – is an income to the lending counterparty, Eisenberg & Noe
proposed that the payments of all banks have to be considered simultaneously
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Fig. 4. A schematic representation of the dependence of probability of contagion
and extend of contagion on the average degree of an ER network.
and solved in a self-consistent fashion. The resulting clearing vector can then
be regarded as the value of all interbank contracts. Thus, instead of modeling
the spread of defaults directly, the model provides a self-consistent solution
for the final state when all payments are settled. This point of view readily
connects with more standard approaches for financial valuation and has since
spurred a range of theoretical [27] and computational research [17].
In particular, the model of Suzuki [28] is noteworthy in this respect. It
not only generalizes the above model allowing for cross-holdings of equity as
well as interbank debt but also clearly formulates it as an extension of the
Merton model to multiple firms. In his ground-breaking work, Merton [29]
showed that liabilities and equity of a firm could be considered and valued as
a short put and long call option on the firm’s assets respectively. Nowadays
this insight forms the foundation of structural credit risk modeling and has
been developed into established industry practice. Valuation in a network con-
text is considerably more complicated as all option values are interdependent
and have to be solved in a self-consistent fashion. Correspondingly, almost
no analytic results are known, and only recently, some extensions including
interbank liabilities of different seniorities [30] or maturities [31] have been
proposed.
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From the perspective of a single firm, an approximate valuation can be ob-
tained by taking into account the solvency risk of its counterparties. Barucca
et al. [32] have shown that several network valuation models, including the
Eisenberg & Noe model and many of its extensions, can be unified in this way.
In their framework, each firm locally adjusts the value of interbank contracts
according to its expected recovery value. Different valuation models are then
obtained via different assumptions about when nominal contract values are
adjusted – either after an actual default or before an expected default. In the
first case, the valuations obtained by each firm agree with the values derived
from self-consistent network considerations whereas they only approximately
reflect market values of interbank contracts in the latter.
Within the framework of network valuation, financial contagion is natu-
rally quantified in marginal terms, i.e., as the impact of infinitesimal asset
price shocks [33]. Demange [34] proposed a threat index considering a bank as
systemically important to the extent that the values of all other banks are sen-
sitive to devaluation of its assets. Taking this idea even further, Bertschinger
& Stobbe [35] have shown how to compute network Greeks, i.e., sensitivities
with respect to several risk factors of interest besides asset prices. In princi-
ple, this allows to quantify the systemic impact of changes in interest rate,
volatilities or asset correlations and naturally extends standard risk manage-
ment practices. Indeed, the Greeks of single asset options are routinely used
in order to asses and hedge the risk of trading portfolios.
3.3 Strategic reactions and network structure
An assumption that is made in the studies mentioned above is that the banks
remain passive in the face of spreading of defaults. While there is some merit
to this argument, it is doubtful that banks remain passive when aware of
a possible default by a counterparty or news of trouble elsewhere in the fi-
nancial system. There has been only minimal effort to model the effect of
the response of banks on financial contagion. Anand et al. [36] incorporate a
strategic decision-making component to the network which makes rewiring of
connections a possibility. They model liquidity hoarding behavior of banks in
which a bank refuses to roll over an interbank loan in fear of default of the
counterparty. The outcome of a coordination game among the neighbors of
a bank decides whether they roll over or withdraw loans made to that bank.
Another work is by Arinaminpathy et al. [37] in which confidence effects are
included in the response of banks. Among other defining features of the model,
it is assumed that long term loans can be made short term and interbank loans
may be withdrawn.
A natural question is what kind of network structure will increase the
stability of a financial system. The question has been a much debated one
regarding all complex systems from the time of the influential article by Her-
bert Simon [38]. Stability of many benchmark network structures of financial
systems has been studied by Battiston et al. [39] with the conclusion that
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Asset 1 Asset 2 Asset 3
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3
Fig. 5. A schematic representation of a bipartite network of banks and assets. If
Bank 1 liquidates its assets in a fire sale, it will depreciate the prizes of Asset 1 and
Asset 2. This will affect Bank 2 as it has exposure to Asset 1. In case Bank 2 also
forced to liquidate its assets, Bank 3 will be affected as it has exposure to Asset 3.
Thus a contagion can spread due to correlated balance sheet structures
network topology plays a prominent role only when the liquidity is low, and
there is no single optimal connection structure.
4 Contagion via fire sale of assets
As already mentioned, apart from the direct interbank claims and obligations,
another way in which the balance sheets of banks influence each other is by
carrying the same or similar asset classes. Portfolio overlaps thus produce an-
other channel for initial defaults to spread, and evidence suggests that this
one is more relevant than the direct channel in real-world systems. Though
several earlier studies like that by Gai & Kapadia did consider minimally the
effect of fire-sale of a single asset held by all banks, it is in more recent liter-
ature that this channel of contagion is analyzed more thoroughly. A general
message here is that too much diversification may not be desirable for the
health of the system even though it might appear as a wise strategy from an
individual bank’s point of view. In fact, prior to the 2007-09 crisis, the prevail-
ing view was that portfolio diversification by individual banks will make them
safer and this will automatically translate into improved safety of the overall
financial system. However, this ignored the crucial fact that diversification by
firms will also create strong correlations across balance sheets thus rendering
the whole system susceptible to price changes of commonly held assets.
4.1 Contagion via overlapping portfolios
An early work which focuses on the network aspects of portfolio overlaps is
by Caccioli et al. [40] who considered a bipartite network of banks and assets.
In this network, banks have only connections to the assets they hold in their
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portfolio (see Fig. 5). Two kinds of initial shocks are considered namely 1)
Devaluation of the price of a randomly chosen asset to zero and 2) Making
a randomly selected bank default. The initial shock then causes defaulting
banks to sell the assets in their portfolio en masse thereby depreciating their
prizes. A specific functional form for the decrease in the price of an asset is
assumed which in general could depend upon market depth and the volume
of assets on sale. The depreciating prizes could cause further defaults thereby
initiating a cascade. The effects of leverage (asset to equity ratio), market
crowding (number of banks per assets), diversification (as measured by the
average degree of banks) and market impact (price change of an asset as a
function of its volume) on the cascading process is studied. A major finding
is that there is a critical leverage below which financial networks are immune
to systemic events, but above which there is a finite probability for them.
A theory based on generalized branching process is also developed. A point
to note here is that the probability and extent of contagion due to fire sales
behaves more or less in a similar way to that in the case of direct counter-party
contagion as depicted in Fig. 4.
Compared to interbank lending network, the asset contagion network can
be more reliably constructed from the data available with regulatory author-
ities. Unlike interbank lending relations, the structure of the balance sheet
of banks are partially publicly available and can be used to construct empir-
ical banks-assets networks. Huang et al. [41] ran an asset contagion model
on US Commercial banks asset network. The latter is constructed using data
from US Commercial Banks Balance Sheet Data (CBBSD) which classifies
assets into thirteen different types. By running simulations on the empirical
network, they could reproduce a large portion of actually failed banks during
the 2007-09 crisis. Similar balance sheet structure of major European Banks
is made available by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and has been
used in several studies.
Banwo et al. [42] considered the effects of power-law distributions for the
degree of the network as well as for balance sheet size. They found that the
power-law degree distribution makes the system less resilient towards the ini-
tial default of a randomly chose bank. Targeted initial defaults of biggest or
less connected banks increase the probability of a default cascade. A power-
law distribution for the assets, on the other hand, increases the resilience of
the network with respect to random initial defaults but not with respect to
targeted defaults. Caccioli et al. [43] studied the effect of both interbank and
asset contagion channels working together. It is found that systemic effects
are amplified when both channels are present.
4.2 Fire-walling financial networks
By now it should be clear that a crucial question in these contexts is to de-
termine which of the banks are most important as far as the stability of the
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network is concerned. Identifying systemic institutions is crucial in develop-
ing strategies and policies to protect the financial system from contagion. A
simple answer to this is the “too-big-to-fail” paradigm in which it is proposed
that the largest banks are the most important ones (which are also presum-
ably well connected). A complimenting one to this is the “too-central-to-fail”
paradigm introduced by Battiston et al. [44] where they introduced a central-
ity measure called Debt rank. Another centrality measure is the Systemicness
of a bank introduced by Greenwood [45] which is proportional to the product
of the size of a bank, its leverage, and connectedness. Information regarding
these variables may not be readily obtainable, and Gangi [46] discusses how
to obtain Systemicness based on only partial data about the network. A re-
cent addition to the list of various centrality measures is the one proposed by
Cont & Schaanning [47] which is based on liquidity weighted portfolio over-
laps. Also, the threat index by Demange [34] and the network ∆ proposed by
Bertschinger & Stobbe [35] are noteworthy in this context.
Cost of preventing contagion
The proposed centrality measures should not just provide a better understand-
ing of the systemic importance of financial institutions, but also should play
a key role in designing cost-effective countermeasures to curtail the financial
crisis. Here, we present a simulation study illustrating this idea. In particular,
we study the model of Cont & Schaanning using portfolio holding data from
the EBA (see [47] for additional details). The data set contains information
about investments of the 90 largest European banks in about 140 asset classes,
most finely disaggregated across European government bonds. We consider a
shock scenario where a single asset is devalued by 30% and simulate ensuing
banking defaults resulting from multiple rounds of fire-sale contagion. We in-
vestigate two ways of fire-walling the system against financial contagion: First
via direct bail-out guaranties and second via asset price guaranties.
Fig. 6 shows the effectiveness of different bail-out strategies. Here, each dot
corresponds to a shock scenario and is slightly jittered to reduce over-plotting.
The all-or-nothing character of contagion is clearly visible with either almost
no or all banks defaulting. Furthermore, providing bail-out guarantees to the
most central banks first, i.e., 10% with the highest centrality, is more effective
in preventing contagion than rescuing banks at random. Still, to fully avoid
a systemic crisis guarantees on more than 5 trillion euros have to be granted
towards more than 30 major banks (30% of 90 banks).
Fig. 7 shows the corresponding results of different buy-out strategies. In
this case, instead of rescuing individual banks, prices of certain assets are
guaranteed. Thus, even in case of a fire-sale, no price impact occurs on the
guaranteed assets preventing any contagion via them. Again, providing buy-
out guarantees in the order of decreasing systemic importance is found to be
more effective than randomly buying them out. Still, at comparable sizes, buy-
out guaranties are found to be less effective in preventing contagion than direct
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Fig. 6. Effectiveness of different bail-out strategies to prevent contagion from the
fire sale of assets. Bail-out guaranties are provided to a fraction of all banks (padded
banks) ranked either randomly (top-right) or according to two different centrality
measures. The two centrality measures considered are the size of banks (bottom-
right) and the one by Cont & Schaanning based on liquidity weighted portfolio
overlaps of banks (bottom-left) [47]. The case with no bail-out guarantees is also
shown (top-left).
bank bail-outs. Note that the nominal size of the guarantee – as stated here
and often quoted by the media during the financial crisis – can be much larger
than the actual implementation cost [48] especially if contagion is prevented.
5 Conclusion and Future directions
The rapidly increasing connectivity and complexity of the global financial
system is a major concern in today’s world as it allows problems originating
in one part to be quickly transmitted to seemingly distant and uncorrelated
parts. Thus it has become ever more critical to understand the collective
behavior of financial systems so that we can prevent or minimize contagious
events. Viewing financial systems as complex networks is a significant step in
this direction. The importance of macroprudential regulation in which more
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Fig. 7. Effectiveness of different buy-out strategies to prevent contagion from the
fire sale of assets. Buy-out guaranties are provided to stabilize the prices of a frac-
tion of all assets (padded assets) ranked either randomly (top-right) or according
to the volume of assets (bottom-right). The centrality measure proposed by Cont
& Schaanning based on liquidity weighted portfolio overlaps of banks [47] is not
applicable here. The case with no buy-out guaranties is also shown (top-left).
consideration is given to the health of the entire system than of individual
institutions has now been recognized and is increasingly becoming a part of
regulatory action.
In this review, we have tried to give a broad overview of various attempts
to understand and model financial networks. A major theme arising out of
these studies is the ‘robust-yet-fragile’ character of financial networks where
contagious events are rare, but when they occur, they are widespread. Prob-
ability of contagion may be reduced by various regulatory measures such as
requiring higher capital ratios and higher liquidity ratios. Identifying systemic
institutions in a financial network is very important, and various centrality
measures have been proposed for that. Protecting systemic institutions is cru-
cial for the health of the entire system, but an issue here is how to set policies
such that the institutions behave in a responsible way towards the health of
the entire financial system. There is the problem of ‘moral hazard’ where a
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systemically important institution, with the full knowledge that it will be res-
cued in a crisis by taxpayers money, engages in reckless risk-taking behavior.
Financial networks are ever evolving and have continuously been subjected
to many internal and external influences like regulatory constraints and fac-
tors from the economy. The technology underlying the formation of financial
networks itself could change in the coming years with the use of Artificial
Intelligence and formalizing financial contracts [49]. Another area to watch
out for is the increasing presence of cryptocurrency [50]. All these have the
potential to change the global landscape of financial networks. Including the
effects of these and other future possibilities is a major challenge going for-
ward. As we mentioned earlier, including the behavior of the banks in the
face of a potential crisis is essential to model banking systems realistically. An
area in which the current models lack realism is in the exclusion of central
banks from modeling as the presence and actions of such a bank can have a
significant effect on systemic risk [51].
Banks and regulatory authorities often do not have a complete picture
of various direct and indirect exposures of institutions in a financial network
[52]. Many recent studies try to integrate theoretical models with the available
data to come up with conclusions about the possibility of systemic events
and strategies or policies to contain them. With the availability of more and
more real-time data and realistic models of bank behavior, it is expected
that effective real-time monitoring of the health of financial systems will be a
reality in the near future. Together with innovative taxation schemes, such as
the one proposed by Poledna & Thurner [53], this might pave the way towards
an economic future without systemic financial crises.
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